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The Development of Legal
Reasoning Skills in Law Students:
An Empirical Study
Stefan H. Krieger
This article describes a study examining the development of legal reasoning
skills in law students through their law school careers and reports some preliminary findings comparing the cognitive development of medical and law students.' During the past two decades, scholars have begun to study the process
by which medical students progress from novices to expert practitioners and
the effect of different curricula on this development.) Studying subjects at all
levels of medical expertise-from first-year medical students to medical residents to experienced specialists in practice, these researchers have developed
theories grounded in empirical findings about the reasoning process of expert
Stefan H. Krieger is professor of law and Director of Clinical Programs, Hofstra University.
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The study was conducted in consultation with educational psychologist Vimla L. Patel
and one of her associates, David Kaufman. It extended her studies on the development of
skills of medical students. Vimla L. Patel et al., Differences Between Medical Students and
Doctors in Memory for Clinical Cases, 2o Med. Educ. 3 (I9 8 6 ).
Q.

See, e.g., David R. Kaufman and Vimla L. Patel, The Nature of Expertise in the Clinical
Interview: Interactive Medical Problem Solving, in Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 461 (Hillsdale, NJ., 1988); Vimla L. Patel, David
R. Kaufman, and Jose F Arocha, Conceptual Change in the Biomedical and Health Sciences Domain, in Advances in Instructional Psychology (Robert Glasser ed., Mahwah,
N.J., 2ooo) [hereinafter Patel et al., Conceptual Change]; Vimla L. Patel, Jos6 E Arocha,
and David R. Kaufman, Expertise and Tacit Knowledge in Medicine, in Tacit Knowledge
in Professional Practice 75 (Robert H. Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath eds., Mahwah,
N.J., 1999) [hereinafter Patel et al., Expertise and Tacit Knowledge]; Vimla L. Patel and
David R. Kaufman, Clinical Reasoning and Biomedical Knowledge: Implications for
Teaching, in Clinical Reasoning in the Health Professions 117 (Joy Higgs and Mark Jones
eds., Oxford, 1995); Vimla L. Patel and GuyJ. Groen, The General and Specific Nature
of Medical Expertise: A Critical Look, in Toward A General Theory of Expertise 93 (K.
Anders Ericsson and Jacqui Smith eds., Cambridge, i99i); Jose E Arocha and Vimla L.
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physicians and the most successful methods for training them.3 This study is
an initial attempt to extend this research program to the field of law.
A disclaimer is necessary at the outset. Findings of an individual study are
only preliminary, subject to confirmation by replication. The sample size was
small; the subjects were from a single law school; and no attempt was made
to control for the differences in background or academic achievement of the
different subject groups. As limited as this study may be, however, it demonstrates that empirical methods can help assess law student learning. By using
an anonymous sample of students and a somewhat controlled environment,
this type of research can provide methodological controls which do not exist
in studies based solely on anecdotal evidence or theoretical analysis.4 I hope
that this study will be tested with further, fine-tuned research, and the data
collected will be reassessed by third parties.
Background
Researchers examining numerous fields have described four levels of
professional expertise: (i) Novice: someone at the early phases of acquiring
expertise or basic competencies; (2) Intermediate: someone who is above the
novice level but below a subexpert; (3) Subexpert: someone with a generic
knowledge but inadequate specialized knowledge of the domain; (4) Expert:
someone with a specialized knowledge of the domain.5 This research has
shown that across domains, experts and novices tend to use different reasoning strategies. Novices tend to use backward-directed reasoning: they first
generate hypotheses from the data they have gathered and then search for
Patel, Novice Diagnostic Reasoning in Medicine: Accounting for Evidence, 4J. Learning
Sci. 355 ('995); Henry P. A. Boshuizen and Henk G. Schmidt, On the Role of Biomedical
Knowledge in Clinical Reasoning by Experts, Intermediates and Novices, i6 Cognitive
Sci. 153 (1992); Vimla L. Patel, Guy J. Groen, and Geoffrey R. Norman, Reasoning and
Instruction in Medical Curricula, io Cognition & Instruction 335 (1993); Vimla L. Patel
and Guy J. Groen, Developmental Accounts of the Transition from Medical Student to
Doctor: Some Problems and Suggestions, 25 Med. Educ. 527 (199'); Vimla L. Patel, Guy
J. Groen, and Geoffrey R. Norman, Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical
Curricula on Problem Solving, 66 Acad. Med. 380 (i99i) [hereinafter Patel et al., Effects
of Conventional and Problem-Based Curricula]; Vimla L. Patel, GuyJ. Groen, andJos6 F
Arocha, Medical Expertise as a Function of Task Difficulty, 18 Memory and Cognition 394
(199o). See generally Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative
Legal Problem Solving, ii Clinical L. Rev. 149, 153-54, 178-85 (2004).
3.

See generally Krieger, Domain Knowledge, supra note 2, at 153-54, 178-85.

4.

The problem administered to the subjects in this study, the transcripts of the subjects' answers (the data collected), the protocols developed to measure the data, and the analysis
conducted are posted on The Student Legal Reasoning Survey website, available at <http://
www.studentlegalreasoning.info> (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).

5.

Patel et al., Expertise and Tacit Knowledge in Medicine, supra note 2, at 8o. "Domain
knowledge" is the explicit knowledge of the concepts, principles, and structures of thinking
about the particular domain in which a problem arises. Id. at 77-78. See generally Krieger,
Domain Knowledge, supra note 2, at 149,

153.
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information to confirm or refute them.' This type of reasoning, also termed
"hypothesis-driven reasoning," is slow and cognitively demanding because
the problem solver must engage in the lengthy process of testing multiple
hypotheses. Experts, on the other hand, tend to use forward-directed or
"data-driven reasoning." The data observed by the problem solver triggers
a line of thinking that leads to a solution in a semi-automatic or reflexive
manner. This type of reasoning makes smaller demands on working memory
than backward-directed reasoning.7
In medical practice, for example, "[f9orward reasoning is characterized by
drawing inferences from available data (e.g., a patient's symptoms) and sequentially moving toward the solution without having to explicitly test and
evaluate hypotheses (e.g., medical diagnoses)."' When examining patients,
forward-reasoning physicians reason inductively, recognizing important cues
in the symptoms that lead directly to diagnoses, ignoring irrelevant information and focusing on relevant cues. Backward-reasoning physicians think
through the problem deductively. They examine their patients and then develop alternative hypotheses about the possible diagnoses and test out these
theories with the information obtained from the patient. In this process, they
tend to focus on more irrelevant facts than experts. Researchers have found
that forward reasoning provides an efficient, natural way of approaching
problems and is more typically associated with accurate problem-solving in
medical diagnosis than backward reasoning.9
Cognitive scientists theorize that experts tend to use forward reasoning
because they have highly developed schema systems. Schemas are "ordered
patterns of mental representations that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding specific objects, concepts, or events." Developed from repeated encounters with similar experiences, "[a] schema can be viewed as a coded
expectation about any aspect of an individual's life, which dictates which
characteristics of a given event are attended to, which are stored for the
future, and which are rejected as irrelevant."' O In regard to the development
6.

See Ed O'Donnell, Use of Forward Versus Backward Reasoning During Audit Analytical
Procedures: Evidence from a Computerized-Process-Tracing Field Study, 44 Acct. & Fin. 75,
76 (2004).

7.

Mark P. Higgins and Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas About Appropriate
Prescribing, 39 Med. Educ. 184, 186 (2005).

8.

Patel et al., Effects of Conventional and Problem-Based Medical Curricula, supra note 2, at
382. For an illustration of the differences between forward and backward reasoning in the
field of financial auditing, see O'Donnell, Use of Forward Versus Backward Reasoning, supra
note 6, at 86.

9.

Researchers have found, however, that experts need to resort to backward-directed reasoning
when they face difficult and factually unfamiliar problems. Faced with such problems, forward reasoning is not helpful because the situation is unlike previous cases, and experts must
engage in developing and testing different hypotheses. Patel et al., Conceptual Change, supra
note 2, at 329, 387.

1o.

See Higgins and Tully, Hospital Doctors, supra note 7, at 185.
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of expertise, researchers theorize that as a result of greater experience in a
particular domain, experts use their well-developed schemas to filter out
reflexively irrelevant data and focus on relevant information to come to a
solution. Novices, who have not yet developed such schema systems, must
rely on backward reasoning for their problem solving, testing multiple hypotheses before they can develop a solution."
Medical Studies
The current study attempts to extend research conducted on the
development of medical expertise by educational psychologist Vimla
Patel and her associates, first at McGill University's Centre for Medical
Education and presently at Columbia University's Department of Biomedical
Informatics.
In several of their studies, Patel and her colleagues explored the
development of the reasoning process throughout medical school.12 In
these studies, subjects were divided into three groups of eight students:
students in their first year of medical school; second-year medical students who had completed all their courses on basic medical science but
had not yet begun clinical work; and final-year students three months
before their graduation. The subjects were given particular medical
problems and asked to recite the facts of the problem, their solution,
and the explanation for their solution.
The findings from this research demonstrate that as novices progress to
become experts, their patterns of reasoning change. Initially, novices rely
on their lay experiences and commonsense explanations for solving medical
problems. Even when provided with relevant medical texts, they are unable
to use them effectively to determine an accurate diagnosis. Second-year medical students are able to identify specific rules that they have learned in their
courses but have difficulty applying them in drawing inferences and developing a coherent explanation for the problem. They recall more facts in a case
than experienced doctors, but many of those facts are irrelevant. And when
they are provided textual material about the problem, their reasoning becomes even less coherent. Finally, final-year medical students reason more like
expert doctors. They recall fewer facts of the case than second-year students
but draw more consistent inferences and develop more coherent explanations
for problems than those students. Even when presented with relevant textual
material after their initial explanations, they do not change their diagnosis
but merely elaborate on their findings.
From these and other studies of medical education and practice, Patel and
her researchers have found that expert medical problem-solving is usually
II.

Id.

I2. Vimla L. Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of Clinical Problems by
Medical Students, 22 Med. Educ. 398 (1988); Vimla L. Patel et al., Reasoning Strategies
and Use of Biomedical Knowledge by Students, 24 Med. Educ. 129 (199o).
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associated with forward-directed reasoning.'3 The data provided to expert
physicians trigger different schemas and reflexively lead to particular diagnoses. Novice medical students, on the other hand, tend to use backward
reasoning, thinking through the problem more explicitly, developing alternative hypotheses about the possible diagnoses, and testing out these
theories with the information obtained from the patient. In the process,
they will focus on more irrelevant facts and will likely use inconsistent and
incoherent reasoning.
The Study
Similar to the medical studies, this study presented law students at several
stages of their education with a problem. Their responses were transcribed,
coded, and then analyzed to identify patterns of reasoning for students at each
stage.' 4 Our goal was to analyze whether and how reasoning skills develop as
law students progress through each year in law school. Do they initially rely
on common sense and lay experience to solve legal problems? Do they then
begin to apply legal rules in solving problems but in an inconsistent and incoherent manner relying on both relevant and irrelevant facts? Do they eventually start to filter out irrelevant facts and focus on facts relevant to an effective
legal theory? When, if ever, do they use backward-directed reasoning?5 Do
they ever start to use the forward-directed reasoning of an expert practitioner?
Our hypothesis was that the development of reasoning skills in law students
would be similar to that of medical students because of the similar cognitive
processes involved in developing expertise. We were unsure, however, how the
differences between the domains of medicine and the law or between pedagogy in medical and law schools would affect the outcomes. The conclusiveness of any tentative findings depends in large part on the data's robustness.
As with much qualitative empirical work, however, future replication of this
study is desirable.
Subjects
The study was conducted with Hofstra Law School students during the
2003-2004 academic year. The research focused on three groups: (i) incoming law students; (2) law students completing the first semester of their second year; and (3) law students nearing graduation. Each group contained ten
volunteer subjects. We initially solicited volunteers with an open memo and
e-mail to each group of students assuring them that their identities would

13.

See supra notes 8-io and accompanying text.

14.

The study was modeled on Patel, Differences Between Medical Students and Doctors, supra
note i; Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of Clinical Problems, supra note
12, at 398; Patel et al., Reasoning Strategies and Use of Biomedical Knowledge, supra note
12, at 129.

15.

These questions were suggested by studies cited in notes 1, 2, 12.
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be kept confidential. 6 When the initial response was not overwhelming, we
offered a $15.oo payment to each participant and were able to fill the full
complement of subjects.
This sample size may appear too small and the absence of any attempt
to account for differences in demography, academic background, or course
experience either between members of each group or between different
groups, may seem flawed. This is a qualitative study however, attempting,
like case studies or ethnographic field work, to analyze data so as to develop
I
explanations about phenomena we cannot directly observe. 7
Stimulus Material
The stimulus material used in this study was a consumer fraud problem
concerning the sale of a used car. The fact pattern is based on the Illinois Appellate Court decision in Miller v. Williams Chevrolet.' In that case the salesman
told the customer that the car had been "executive driven" and was a "great
used car." The title of the car that was given to the buyer, however, stated that
the former owner was a rental car company. The customer experienced no
serious malfunctioning of the car. While the actual case raised issues of both
common law fraudulent misrepresentation and alleged violation of a state consumer fraud statute, the problem provided that no statute pertained to the
situation so that the inquiry would be limited to issues concerning a possible
common law claim.
The problem raised four primary legal issues: (i) whether "executive driven"
was a representation of a fact or mere puffing; (2) whether the representation
was material; (3) whether the buyer reasonably relied on the misrepresentation;
and (4) whether the customer incurred any damages.
The case was selected as a basis for the problem for several reasons. The
factual issues were simple enough so that students entering law school would
have some lay understanding-either through general reading or their own
firsthand experiences-of fraud claims. Serious analysis of the legal issues in
the case, however, required a basic knowledge of the elements of common
law fraudulent misrepresentation. Since basic elements of common law fraud,
including the issue of puffing, are covered in the first-year curriculum, secondyear subjects should have had some exposure to rules relating to the problem
and should have some ability to reason about them. The problem, therefore,

i6.

Copies of the solicitation memos are available at <http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
memos.html> (last visited Sept. I6, 2006). Hofstra's Institutional Review Board found
that this study was exempt from its rules governing humans as research subjects because it
concerned educational testing.

17.

Richard K. Neumann, Jr. and Stefan H. Krieger, Empirical Inquiry Twenty Years after the
Lawyering Process, io Clinical L. Rev. 349, 353 (2o03).

18.

326 Ill. App. 3 d 642, 762 N.E.2d i(2oo0). A copy of the problem is contained in Appendix
"A."
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provided an opportunity to assess the effect of this doctrinal exposure in the
first year.
Moreover, the subject of fraudulent misrepresentation arises throughout the
law school curriculum, for example, in classes such as Business Organizations,
Commercial Transactions, Debtor-Creditor, Real Estate Transactions, Securities Regulation, and Bankruptcy. Accordingly, it was probable that many if not
all of the third-year subjects had obtained some further and repeated exposure
to the rules of common law fraudulent misrepresentation after the first year.
The problem therefore created the opportunity to measure the effect of this
additional knowledge. Also, some aspects of the problem raise more advanced
legal, factual, and policy issues for which a level of knowledge different from
mastery of common law rules was helpful. A full consideration of the issue of
damages, for example, required examination of diminished resale value rather
than the more obvious deterioration in functioning. Finally, the gaps in the
fact pattern, for example about the specifics of the buyer's discussion with the
salesman, provided opportunities for identification of possible circumstantial
evidence and areas for fact investigation.
In addition to the facts from the actual case, several red herrings were
included in the fact pattern to add to its complexity: (i) the buyer was described as a thirty-seven year old electrician with an eighth grade education;
(2) English was identified as his second language; (3) while the client's name
is "Samos," the name on the title was written as "Stamos"; and (4) the sticker
stated that the car was sold "as is." The first two facts were added to create
some sympathy for the buyer but neither appears to have any legal relevance.
The "client" in the problem was literate (he had an eighth-grade education,
read the sticker at the dealership, and signed all the paperwork), and did not
complain that he misunderstood anything that the salesman told him or the
documents provided to him. Under these circumstances, the client's limited
intellectual and language capacities probably were not relevant to a common
law misrepresentation claim.'9 Likewise, the misspelling of the name was irrelevant to any actionable common law claim. This fact was included, however,
to assess whether any subjects, especially first-year students, might focus on
purely formalistic claims. Finally, the reference to the "as is" representation on
the sticker was included to examine whether the subjects had an understanding of the relationship between a tort claim for misrepresentation and waiver
of contractual warranties."

19.

In most circumstances, a reasonable person standard is used for determining the
justifiable reliance element for a misrepresentation claim. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §538(2)(a).

2o.

A waiver of warranties usually does not provide a defense to a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. See, e.g., Gable v. Boles, 718 So.2d 68, 72 (Ala. 1998); Wagner v.
Rao, 18o Ariz. 486, 885 P.2d 174, 177 (Ariz. 1994); Godwin Aircraft, Inc. v. Houston, 851
S.W.2d 8M6, 822 (Tenn. 1993); Reilly v. Mosley, 301 S.E.2d 649, 651 (Ga. 1983).
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Before the problem was administered to the different subject groups, it
was test run on two experts to identify the existence of any major glitches.,,
These experts, an experienced commercial law litigator and a seasoned trial
court judge, readily identified fraudulent misrepresentation as the possible
cause of action, identified most of the issues discussed in the actual case, and
disregarded the irrelevant facts. One expert stated that as a practical matter,
the case was not economically feasible unless a lawyer could get attorneys'
fees. Since this issue requires knowledge of the mechanics of law practice
management rather than substantive law, an attempt was made to remove it
from consideration by including language in the problem that the state has a
statute "that allows a court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in
'
any case concerning a consumer transaction. ""
Interview Methods
This study was conducted using "semi-structured" interviews of each of
the subjects.23 In each interview, the subjects were asked to verbalize their
thoughts as they had them. The purpose of using this method was to replicate as closely as possible the actual cognitive process of the subjects. A
major problem faced by cognitive psychologists in studying thinking is that
"thinking cannot be observed by other people." One of the methods developed to address this difficulty is the "think-aloud protocol," in which subjects
are asked during the interview to verbalize their thoughts spontaneously as
they emerge in attention. Even though use of this method does not provide a
perfect match between subjects' thoughts and reports, researchers have found
consistently strong evidence that this method results in a strong correlation
4
between the two.
In some situations, however, the think-aloud protocol is ineffective by itself
for the collection of relevant data. For example, in routine cases, experts often
provide very sparse answers, resulting in unsatisfactory information for assessing their reasoning process.2 5 For this reason, Patel and her associates have refined the think-aloud protocol by using various kinds of probing tasks to elicit
a more detailed verbalization of the reasoning process. These semi-structured
21.

Given the small sample size of two, the purpose of the test run was only to determine if any
major defects existed in the drafting of the problem, not to determine the "expert" answer.

22.

A number of states have statutes with such attorneys' fees provisions. See, e.g., Mont. Code
Ann. §30-14-133(3); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1345.09(0(2); Idaho Code §48-6o8(4).

23.

For a complete description of the theory underlying this methodology, see Vimla L. Patel et
al., Diagnostic Reasoning and Medical Expertise, 31 Psychol. Learning & Motivation 187,
194-95 0994).

24.

Researchers have found that if subjects are asked to recall their reasoning process after a
long delay, the completeness and accuracy of recall is impaired, and subjects are prone to
infer their thoughts as opposed to correctly recall them from memory. K. Anders Ericsson,
Protocol Analysis, in A Companion to Cognitive Science 425, 429, 430 (William Bechtel and
George Graham eds., Malden, Mass., 1998).

25.

Patel et al., Diagnostic Reasoning and Medical Expertise, supra note 23, at 194-95.
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interviews require subjects to answer specific questions about their reasoning.26
Subjects are still encouraged merely to verbalize their thoughts but are given
particular prods during their interviews.
The semi-structured interviews in this study were all conducted and taped by
second- and third-year law student research assistants. A script was drafted for
the interviews and research assistants were trained in techniques for using the
modified think-aloud protocol.7 Pursuant to the script, the research assistants
told the subjects that they were participating in a study on the development of legal reasoning by law students; that they were not being graded on their answers;
and that although their responses were being taped, their identities would be
kept confidential. The research assistants then described the process the subjects
should use in answering the question at the end of the problem:
When answering the question please verbalize your thoughts as naturally as
possible. Please do not explain or rationalize your thoughts but rather communicate them in a free flowing manner. The easiest way to do this is to go
through your normal thought process but say everything aloud as if no one
else were in the room.
At this point, the subjects were given a sample LSAT problem to give them
a test run at the process. Throughout the answer to this problem, the researchers would discourage subjects from explaining their answers or reasoning and
encourage them to verbalize their normal thought process. Then the research
assistants gave the subjects the problem and told them:
Please read the problem (aloud or to yourself) and verbalize any thoughts you
have asyou read. This should mirror your normal thought process. It should
be as natural as possible. Remember, just as in the previous exercise you only
need to report what you are thinking without explaining why you think it. Following the presentation of the case you will read a question. The information
on the page is all the information available regarding the problem.
After the subjects read the problem, the research assistant retrieved it and
asked them to provide a summary of the facts of the case. After exhausting
the subjects' memory of the facts, the research assistants returned the problem to the subjects and asked them for their thoughts on the question at the
end of the problem. In order not to skew the data, the research assistants
were trained to refrain from asking the subjects closed questions about their
responses and only to encourage verbalization of their reasoning process.
When subjects ended their answers, they were prodded to verbalize any other
thoughts they had.

26.

Id.

27.

A copy of the protocol is included in the material for this study's website, available at
<http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/script.html> (last visited Sept. 16, 2oo6).
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Coding the Data
The tapes were transcribed after the interviews and marked at fifteen
second intervals so the time periods for a subject's reading the problem, reciting the facts, and starting the answer to the problem could be calculated.28
The transcripts were then analyzed using the "propositional analysis" method
employed by Patel and her associates.29 This technique involved (i) segmenting each of the transcripts by clause (propositions); (2) identifying each of the
facts set forth in the written problem; (3) identifying each of the rules discussed
in the decision in Miller v. Williams Chevrolet; (4) coding each of the transcripts,
noting all the facts and rules which corresponded with those in the problem
and case and those that did not; (5) coding the transcripts for all inferences
subjects drew from the facts; and (6) coding the transcripts for procedural rules
or approaches identified by the subjects (e.g., need for legal research or fact
°
investigation or consideration of evidentiary or burden allocation issues).3
From their review of other studies of the reasoning process, Patel and
her colleagues have concluded that the propositional analysis techniqueexamining discrete propositions in the subjects' responses-is superior to
other methods for examining complex written or spoken discourse about
the solving of a problem. Some researchers, for example, consider only the
common sense surface structure of the problem solvers' answers by merely
examining the literal words stated. Such an approach, Patel and her associates assert, fails to take into account research on the psychology of comprehension that indicates that stimuli are stored in memory in small chunks of
meaning. These chunks can best be represented as propositions. Accordingly, the Patel researchers argue, the propositional analysis technique more
adequately represents the actual process of memory and comprehension
by focusing on the propositions contained in the transcripts, the discrete
chunks of the subjects' responses. 3'
In the present study, the process of coding was initially conducted independently
by my two research assistants and me. Protocols were developed for the different
types of coding.3' After the individual codings were made, the three coders met and

28.

Copies of the transcripts are available at <http://wwwstudentlegalreasoning.info/
groupi.pdf>, <http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/group2.pdf>, and <http://www.
studentlegalreasoning.info/group3.pdf> (last visited on Sept. 16, 2oo6).

29.

Patel et al., Differences Between Medical Students and Doctors, supra note i, at 5. For a full
description of the theories underlying propositional analysis technique and the empirical
research supporting it, see Walter Kintsch, The Representation of Meaning in Memory
(Hillsdale, N.J., 1974); Carl H. Frederiksen, Representing Logical and Semantic Structure
of Knowledge Acquired from Discourse, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 371 (1975).

30.

Patel et al., Differences Between Medical Students and Doctors, supra note i, at 3-4.

31.

Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of Clinical Problems, supra note 12,
at 3-4.

32.

Specific descriptions of these protocols will be provided in the following section.
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reconciled any discrepancies. Comparisons were made between the codings for the
different groups.
Analysis of Data
Level ofRecall ofFacts
The transcriptions were first coded for identification of facts during the
second stage of the interview when subjects were asked to summarize the
facts.33 The purpose of this coding was to determine if, through the acquisition of a legal knowledge base throughout the years in law school, the subjects' treatment of relevant and irrelevant facts in a legal problem changed
significantly. Examining each proposition stated by the subjects during their
fact recitals, we independently coded the facts as "fully recalled" or "partially recalled," and reconciled them using a standard protocol.34 We coded a
subject's statement as fully recalled if it substantially restated the proposition
in the problem; if the recital omitted or misstated a material element of the
proposition, it was coded as partially recalled.
Additionally, each proposition set forth in the problem was scored for its
relevancy: (i) most relevant to answering the question in the problem; (2) relevant to answering the question; (3) limited relevance to answering the question; and (4)little, if any, relevance to answering the question. To make this
determination, I analyzed the text of the Miller decision and identified every
fact the court used in its analysis of the common law fraudulent misrepresentation claim.35 We scored the essential facts to the plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action as "i" and cumulative evidence in regard to the most
relevant facts as "2." We scored every contextual fact for the relevant propositions (those facts that would have to be shown at trial to lay the foundation for
the relevant facts) as "3"" We also scored any statement that might be used as
a defense to a fraud cause of action as "3." All other statements were scored as
"4." Of the sixty-four factual propositions in the problem, five were scored as
having most relevance;36 eleven were scored as being relevant; thirty-two were
33.

The protocol used for the fact recitation coding is posted on the study's website available at
<http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/protocol.html> (last visited Sept. 16, 2oo6). In one
of the Group i (first-year student) interviews the protocol was not followed precisely. The research assistant failed to retrieve the problem after the subject (Subject 3) read it and allowed
the subject to give a summary of the facts of the case with the problem in hand. To address
that problem, we coded that subject's recital of facts focusing solely on his/her identification
of facts in the answer to the problem.

34.

A chart reflecting those codings is available at <http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/factid.html> (last visited on Sept. 16, 2oo6).

35.

This analysis is available at <http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/relevancy.html> (last
visited Sept. 16, 2oo6). We did not use the responses of the test run expert practitioners,
supra note 21 and accompanying text, for this scoring because of the small sample size. A
significant correlation existed, however, between the facts identified by those experts and
those set forth in the Miller decision.

36.

These facts were: (i) Warren told [plaintiff] that the car was "executive driven"; (2) [plaintiff]
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scored as having less relevance; and sixteen were scored as having little or no
relevance.37
The summary of the data on the subjects' recital of facts is set forth in Tables
to 4. In regard to recall of all sixty-four of the factual propositions, Table i shows
that second-year students (Group 2) recalled a higher mean percentage of all the
factual propositions than first-year students (Group i) -24.7 percent compared
to 20.4 percent. Third-year students, however, recalled only 2o.2 percent of all
the propositions, slightly less than the second-year subjects and comparable to
first-year subjects. There appears to be some difference between the mean percentage of the overall propositions-both relevant and irrelevant-recalled by
the subjects in the different groups with only the second-year students recalling
a higher percentage than subjects in the other groups.
Table i: Mean Percentage of Propositions Recalled
Group 2
Group 3
Group i
I5-6 (4"7)
19.2 (3.2)
14.1 (5.9)
Fully Recalled
4-5 (2)
5-5 2
6.3 I.8
Partially Recalled

Total

20.4 (5)-9

24.7 (43)

20.2

(5.8)

*SD in parentheses
As to the recall of relevant propositions, on the other hand, the differences
are more substantial. As Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, second-year students on
average recalled 56 percent of the most relevant propositions and 23.6 percent
of the relevant facts. First-year students, on average, recalled only 38 percent
of the most relevant facts and i9.1 percent of the relevant facts. Third-year
students, on average, showed no improvement over their second year counterparts and actually showed a decrease in recall, although not to the level of the
first-year subjects. They recalled 42 percent of the most relevant facts and 2o
percent of the relevant facts.
Table 2: Mean Percentage of Most Relevant Propositions Recalled
Group 3
I
Group I
Group 2
6 (1.2)
28 (.8)
I 14 (.3)
Fully Recalled
14 (-5)
20 7)
24 (-9)
Partially Recalled
42 (7)
56
(i)
38
(i.i)
Total
*SD in parentheses
found out the previous owner was an automobile rental company; (3) [plaintiff] relied on the
statement that the car was "executive driven"; (4) plaintiff wants any damages to which he is
entitled; and (5) your state has no statute that applied to the situation.
37.

In determining relevance, we did not consider possible affirmative defenses to the claim.
The question in the problem asked whether the plaintiff had any viable legal claim for damages, not whether he would eventually prevail. Like the Miller court, we used a summary
judgment standard and focused only on the facts necessary to establish a prima facie case of
common law fraud.
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Table 3: Mean Percentage of Relevant Propositions Recalled
Group i
Fully Recalled
13.6 (.8)
Partially Recalled
5 5.8)
Total
19- (.4)
*SD in parentheses

Group 2

Group 3

20.9 (1.2)

15.5 (1.2)

2.7 (.5)
23.6 0.3)

4.5 )
20(1.8)

Table 4 reflects the mean percentage of relevant facts recalled in relation
to the number of propositions actually recollected by the subjects. Of the
propositions recalled, second-year students recalled a slightly higher mean
percentage of relevant facts than first-year students- 3 4. 7 percent compared
to 30.8 percent-and a slightly lower mean percentage of irrelevant facts-6 5 .3
percent compared to 69.2 percent. But again, third-year students showed no
improvement. Of the facts they recalled, only 33.6 percent were relevant.
Table 4: O fAll Propositions Identified, Mean Percentage of Relevant
Propositions Recalled
Group i
Group 2
Group 3
Most Relevant
14.6 (I.I)
i8 (i)
16-4 (-7)
Relevant
16.2 1.4)
6.71.3)
17.2 (.8)
Total
30.8 (2-.1)
34.7 .8)
33.6 (2.2)
*SD in parentheses
In terms of the ability to fully and accurately recall propositions, third-year
students had improved results in regard to the most relevant facts recalled. As
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, of the most relevant propositions these subjects,
on average, recalled, 66.7 percent were fully recited, compared to 36.8 percent
for first-year students and 66.3 percent for second-year students. As to relevant
propositions they recalled, on average, third-year students fully recalled 77.5
percent, compared to 88.6 percent for second-year students and 71.2 percent
for first-year students. Apparently, third-year students recall a smaller mean
percentage of overall propositions and relevant facts than do first or secondyear students, but when they do recollect a particular proposition, they are
more likely to recall it more fully and accurately than first-year students and
are at least as likely to recall it as fully as second-year students.
As might be expected, in relation to the specific relevant propositions
recalled, second- and third-year students usually performed much better
than first-year students. In regard to the specific wording of the alleged misrepresentation, for example, only one first-year student fully and accurately
recalled "Warren told [Samos] that the car was executive driven," while
four second-year students and six third-year students fully and accurately
recalled that proposition.3' Only four first-year students accurately recalled
38.

One first-year student recalled that Samos "eventually decided on buying a car which he
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"Samos wants any damage to which he is entitled," while nine second-year
students and seven third-year students fully recalled this proposition. In regard to certain propositions, however, few students recalled very relevant
propositions. No first-year students, for instance, recalled-either fully or
partially-the proposition, "[Samos] relied on the statement that the car was
'executive driven."' Only one second-year student recollected that fact, and
only two third-years recalled it.
In summary, second-year students on average recalled more overall
propositions and more relevant propositions than first-year students did.
They also recalled more accurately the textual material provided. The
knowledge gained in the first year-and-a-half of law school appears to affect
students' ability to identify and recall relevant propositions in a problem.
The performance of the third-year students, though, is different from that
of their medical student counterparts. In the Patel studies, the final-year
medical students were able to focus on more relevant features of the clinical information provided than students in earlier years of medical school.39
Third-year law students, however, identified a higher mean percentage of
relevant propositions than first-year students, but a lesser mean percentage
of relevant propositions than second-year students. And in terms of all
propositions recalled, they identified a mean percentage of relevant facts
comparable to that of their second-year counterparts. They out-performed
second-year students only in regard to their recall of most relevant facts
and that was by a very slight margin. These findings appear to raise some
questions about the effectiveness of the final year-and-a-half of law school
on students' ability to focus on the relevant facts in a legal problem.
DrawingofInferences
In addition to reciting specific factual propositions in the problem, many
of the subjects drew inferences from the facts in the problem either during
the recital or answer stages of the interviews. An inference was defined as
the drawing of a conclusion from known facts based on premises known
or assumed to be true.40 In some instances, legal rules were the underlying
premises of some of the subjects' inferences. An analysis of the identification
of legal rules will be given in the next part. In other cases, the premises were
based on the subjects' lay experience. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the effect, if any, of law school on the tendency of students to rely on
common knowledge in drawing inferences.
believed to be executive driven." Another first-year student recollected that the dealer told
him that the car "was previously owned by, a, um, executive, some sort of executive ownership." A third recalled that "the paperwork said it was a used car and that it is...was
executive driven."
39.

Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of Clinical Problems, supra note 12, at
405.

40.

See David A. Binder and Paul Bergman, Fact Investigation: From Hypothesis to Proof 8Q
(St. Paul, Minn., 1984).
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To collect data on inferences, my research assistants and I independently
examined every proposition in the transcripts throughout the responses to the
problem. We coded every instance in which a subject did not merely recite
a fact in the problem but made an assumption about it or drew an inference
from it. We then reconciled the codings.
On average, first- and second-year students identified approximately the
same number of inferences from common experience (2.4 and 2.7 inferences
respectively), but third-year students drew substantially fewer inferences (1.3).
These findings suggest three possible hypotheses. First, as might be expected, in reasoning about legal problems, students entering law school rely heavily on inferences drawn from their own common experience. The transcripts
for these subjects are replete with such inferences: "Mr. Stamos's second language is English...probably first language is most likely some Spanish"; "the
first thing I think of when I think of an auto rental is they, they really mess
these cars up"; "he would be somebody easily taken advantage of by smooth
talking salesperson"; "you would think that in buying a new car you would
ask a lot of questions." Interestingly, second-year students continued to draw
such inferences: "signs a whole bunch of paperwork... uh, typical sort of
transaction"; "I think the dealer should have been aware of the person's limited knowledge"; "[he later found out that it was used in a rental car agency]
which I am guessing means that the car took a lot more abuse."
Second, the actual substance of the inferences from first- and second-year
students indicates what law instructors might call sloppy reading of the problem. Sometimes the students explicitly stated that they were making assumptions about the facts. But, at other times, students relied on their common
experience to read facts into the problem. Here are some examples from first
year: "he definitely wants used car because he can't afford"; "[after the test
drive Samos] liked the car"; "he was happy with the purchase." Second-year
students fared no better: "they don't speak English well"; "he didn't really
know what [executive driven] meant"; "[he was] not highly educated." At least
from these transcripts, it seems as if the second-year students continue to have
problems paying attention to detail in the problem.
Finally, the substantial decline in inference-drawing by third-year
students suggests that by the third year, students may be better able to
pay closer attention to detail than their first- and second-year counterparts. Indeed, in most instances, when the students drew inferences, they
couched it in tentative language (e.g., "apparently the uh, the car doesn't
have any malfunction"). It may also indicate, however, that these students feel inhibited from using their common experience in solving legal
problems. Perhaps the questioning regimen in law school classes and experience with exams have ingrained in them the notion that they should
just stick to the facts given in a problem rather than rely on their own
experiences.
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Identification of Rules
The transcripts were also coded for identification of rules. A rule was
defined as any factor that the subject took into account in determining if
Samos had a claim for damages. The purpose of this coding was to assess
the effect of increased exposure to legal doctrine throughout law school on
students' ability to identify rules applicable to a particular legal problem.
Reviewing each proposition recited by the subjects during any portion of
their discussion of the case, my research assistants and I identified every rule
considered by each of the subjects.4' After we reconciled these identifications,
the rules were scored for their relevance. A rule was scored as relevant only if it
concerned one of the elements of a claim for common law fraudulent misrepresentation: (i) false representation; (2) material fact; (3) dealer's knowledge of
the falsehood; (4) intent to induce reliance; (5) reliance by the customer; and
(6) damages.42 Since our assessment was focused on identification of relevant
rules, we scored a proposition as relevant even if the subject's application of
the rule was different from the court's in Williams.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the data on identification of rules. The average
number of total rules identified by subjects increased from group-to-group.
On average, first-year students identified 2.7 rules, second years identified 3.1,
and third years identified 4.5 rules. The average number of rules identified as
relevant increased only slightly between the different groups-i.i relevant rules
for Group i subjects compared to 1.3 for Group 2 and 1.9 for Group 3. But in
regard to rules that are irrelevant to a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the
numbers increased substantially-i.6 irrelevant rules for Group i compared to
1.8 for Group 2 and 2.6 for Group 3. In fact, in respect to total rules identified,
nearly 6o percent of the rules identified by all three groups were irrelevant to a
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation.

41.

A chart reflecting the rules identified by each subject is available at <http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ruleid.html> (last visited Sept. 16, 2oo6). Since a number of subjects
began to answer the question raised in the problem during their fact recital, we did not limit
our analysis of rule identification to the "Answer" stage of the interview.

42.

Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3 d at 648, 762 N.E.2d at 7. While this definition is very narrow, and
it can be argued that experienced lawyers might be able to identify other possible causes
of action for Samos from the facts in the problem, the most relevant common law claim
from these facts is one for fraudulent misrepresentation. Our goal here was to examine the
subjects' ability to identify rules concerning the most relevant cause of action, not possible
rules applicable to some less relevant hypothetical claim. Accordingly, by scoring a rule
as irrelevant, we intended only to note that it was not applicable to a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation.
As with the relevancy scoring for the fact recital, in determining rule relevancy, we did
not consider possible affirmative defenses to the claim since the question in the problem
asked whether the plaintiff had any viable legal claim for damages, not whether he would
eventually prevail.
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Table 5: Average Number of Rules Identified
Group i
Group 2
Group 3
.
.8 )
Average Number of
2.7 ('9)
3 -1
!4.57(.
Total Rules Identified
Average Number
i- (1.3)
1.3 (1-3)
T
I-9 .2)
of Relevant Rules
Identified
Average Number
1.6 (.8)
1.8 (1.5)
2.6(2.8)
of Irrelevant Rules
Identified
*SD in parentheses
Table 6: Mean Percentage of Relevant Rules Identified
Group i
Group 2
Group 3
Relevant Rules
40-7 (.4)
Identified
Irrelevant Rules
59.3 (.4)
Identified
*SD in parentheses

41-9(3)

42.4 7T4
57 . 8 (.4)

The Group 3 subjects, more than their counterparts in other groups,
appeared prone to generate different possible theories. One subject, for
example, stated:
I wonder if a mechanic looked at the car and said that there was anything
wrong with it I am not really sure why who the previous owner is makes not
much of a.. .of a difference unless the dealership did falsify the documentsth
presented to this man um so far it doesn't seem like the fact that he has an 8
grade education or has English as a second language makes a difference here
because it doesn't seem like he was really taken advantage of.. .and the sticker
said that there was no warranty on the car so he was alerted to the fact that he
was buying the car as is.. mean I guess he didn't know that he was entitled
to know who the owner is he could have done a vin number search to see if it
had been in any accidents or um had been stolen or had some kind of bad past
history.... I also don't know what the difference between executive driven as
he interpreted it and the used car uh car dealership owning the car.
Another subject responded:
There is always a lemon law warranty of some sort and every state has that,
uh New York State definitely has that. Um and which, depending upon the
mileage of the car, um goes to 30 days, 6o days, 90 days depending on the
different parts of the car. So that would be um fraud there by not issuing
a warranty. Um... also non-disclosure of it being from an automobile rental
agency is also goes against, I believe, regulation Z of New York State law,
um in which they have to disclose if it was a rental car previously having to
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disclose that on sales receipts, um and I believe there are usually check boxes
on the retail installment contract, and such uM.
These responses seem to be drawn from the subject's own experience (e.g.,
the need to have a mechanic inspect a used car), doctrine learned in law school
classes (e.g., lemon law warranties and undue influence), or experience in
clerkship positions (Regulation Z or VIN searches).
These findings suggest that as students progress in law school, they are able
to identify more rules in relation to a legal problem. But, at least in regard to
the problem presented to the subjects in this study, their ability to identify
the most relevant rules increases only slightly. At the end of their third year
they seem prone to generate indiscriminately a large number of rules, many of
which are irrelevant. This finding seems to reflect what Patel and her associates
term "the intermediate effect." They have found that intermediates on their expertise scale, when confronted with a problem in their specialty, often engage
in a wide scope of information gathering without screening out irrelevant information. They simply process too much garbage.43 Here, third-year students
appear to be processing too much garbage. For example, even though the
problem explicitly stated, "Your state has no statute that applies to this type of
situation," some of the Group 3 subjects appeared unable to keep themselves
from identifying possible statutory rules applicable to the problem.
Identification ofProceduralAspects ofthe Case
Our review of the transcripts indicated that besides identifying substantive
legal rules, subjects also explicitly raised recurring issues relating to the procedural aspects of the case. These included the lack of certain factual information in the problem and the need for fact investigation; the need for additional
legal research; the impact of the lack of a statute on the problem-solving process; and the evidentiary and burden allocation issues raised by the problem.
We decided to examine whether law school appeared to have any effect on the
subjects' tendency to identify issues in those categories.
As with our analysis of fact recital, inference drawing, and rule identification,
my research assistants and I reviewed each proposition in all the transcripts and
coded different procedural issues raised by the subjects. We then reconciled
these codings. Table 7 summarizes the data collected on these issues.

43.

Patel and Groen, The General and Specific Nature of Medical Expertise, supra note 2, at

532.
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Table 7: Procedural Categories Identified
Group i
Group 2
Total Number of
,o0-3)
Procedural Categories
Identified
Total Number
1
Identifying Need for
Fact Investigation
777 uNumber
4
Identifying General
Need for Legal
Research
Total Number
i
Identifying Need for
Statute
Total Number
I
Identifying Need for
Analogous Cases
Total Number
i
Identifying Burden
Allocation
Total Number
o
Identifying
Evidentiary Rules
Total Number
2
Identifying Lack of
Statute
*SD in parentheses

Group 3

9(I.I)

15 (2.I)

3

3

o

1

3

I

o

o

3

Given the fairly low occurrence of identification of a number of these issues,
most of our findings on this aspect of the study are tentative at best. Nevertheless, the data raise a few interesting questions. First, the failure of most
upper-level students-many of whom had completed Evidence-to consider
evidentiary and burden allocation issues seems puzzling. Only one subject
(a member of Group 2) raised an issue relating to evidentiary rules (parole
evidence), and only two subjects (one each from Groups i and 3) considered
questions concerning burdens of proof. While the students may have felt limited to consideration of purely substantive legal issues since the problem only
asked whether the client had "any viable legal claim for damages," I find it
surprising that more students did not raise some evidentiary issues given that
the problem referred to numerous documents and a significant conversation
between the salesman and the client.
Second, while the identification of the need for additional fact investigation
increases between Group i and 2, the reverse was the case for the need for legal
research. As shown in Table 7, only one Group i subject raised the need for further
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fact investigation, but three subjects from both Groups 2 and 3 identified this issue.
In regard to the need for legal research, however, four Group i subjects identified
this issue but no Group 2 subjects and only one Group 3 subject raised it. (One
subject from each of the groups also identified the need to find analogous cases.)
While this dropoff seems odd, it could have been caused by the instructions by the
interviewers that "[t]he information on the page is all the information available
regarding the problem." Perhaps considering this problem similar to a law school
exam, subjects felt reluctant to merely answer it with the response that they needed
to conduct further legal research. They may also have felt, however, that the problem was so simple, that they already had the requisite knowledge to respond to the
question.
A more significant issue raised by the data on procedural aspects of the case
concerns the identification of the lack of a statute. While only two Group i and
three Group 2 subjects identified this issue, more than half of the members of
Group 3 (six subjects) raised it. Several, in fact, expressed frustration that no
statute applied to the problem. One third-year student, for example, responded, "It is tough to answer when you say that the state has no statute that applies to this situation." Another observed, "I also don't know if he should even
bring the case because the only statute that we have is that he gets attorney's
fees." These data suggest that as students progress through law school, they
are more aware of statutory causes of action and in fact would rather rely on
such claims to solve legal problems than consider common law theories.
Preliminary Hypotheses on the
Development of Expertise in Law Students
The Patel studies of medical students show that as these students progressed
through medical school, their reasoning strategies for solving medical problems
changed significantly. Entering medical students relied on lay experiences and
common sense explanations for medical problems and even when provided
medical knowledge could not apply it effectively. Second-year students recalled
more facts in a case but many of them were irrelevant. Moreover, while they
could identify more rules than first-year students, they had difficulty developing coherent solutions to problems. Final-year students recalled fewer facts in
the case than second-year students and were able to identify better patterns of
relationships in problems and to develop coherent explanations for problems.
These students were beginning to display the forward-directed reasoning approach used by experts in solving routine problems and identifying important
cues provided in the problem to develop a hypothesis. Novice medical students
used backward-directed reasoning, developing alternative hypotheses and testing them with the information provided. In the process, they identified more
facts and rules but were less likely than their final-year counterparts to develop
coherent solutions.
The findings in the current study are generally similar to those of the
Patel research. Yet in some significant respects, especially in regard to thirdyear law students, they appear to be quite different. As might be expected,
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the reasoning strategy of entering law students seems to be similar to that
of their medical student counterparts. They relied heavily on their common
sense experience and recalled fewer total facts and substantially fewer relevant facts than second-year law students. Perhaps because of their lack of
knowledge of legal doctrine, they were less able to fully and accurately recall
the facts in the problem and did not pay close attention to the factual details, often making assumptions about the case without realizing it. Finally,
they identified fewer rules, although several did identify the need for further
legal research. Entering students seem to rely on their lay experience and
to have difficulty handling the facts in a problem or identifying applicable
rules. As in the medical school studies, the findings of this research show
entering students rely on their lay experience and have difficulty handling
the facts in a problem or identifying applicable rules.
Like their counterparts in medical school, second-year law students displayed
some significant changes in their reasoning process. Apparently using their increased knowledge of legal doctrine, they recalled substantially more relevant
facts than first-year students and were better able to fully and accurately recite
them and to remember the precise language of key elements of the relevant
claim. These subjects, on average, were more likely to identify legal rules than
entering students. But second-year law students were unable to distinguish adequately between relevant and irrelevant rules. Moreover, the students in this
group often continued to rely on their own experiences in reasoning about
the problem and still had difficulty paying close attention to the details of the
problem. In short, like second-year medical students, their reasoning did not
reflect a coherent approach to the problem or an ability to filter out irrelevant
facts and rules.
Unlike the final-year students in the medical school studies, in most respects,
the third-year subjects in this study showed only a slight change in reasoning
strategy compared to second-year students. Similar to their medical student
counterparts, on average they recalled fewer total facts than second-year students. They also were more proficient in fully and accurately reciting the language of the relevant facts, and, unlike the first- and second-year subjects, relied
less on their own common experience in reasoning about the problem.
But unlike medical students, there was little change between their recall
of relevant facts and that of second-year students. In other words, in contrast
to final-year medical students, third-year law students apparently had not
yet refined the skill of distinguishing adequately between relevant and irrelevant facts. The rule identification findings support this conclusion. Fourthyear medical students focused on developing a coherent explanation for a
problem. On the other hand, graduating law students, on average, identified substantially more rules than first- and second-year students, and a large
number of those rules were irrelevant to the claim for common law fraudulent misrepresentation. Indeed, the theory generation exhibited by several of
the third-year subjects is more similar to the backward-directed reasoning of
the second-year medical students than the forward-directed reasoning of the
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graduating medical students. They simply do not appear to have begun to
develop the screening process used by experts.
A number of reasons can be hypothesized for these findings about the
strategies of third-year law students. Perhaps the doctrine learned in the first
two years of law courses has not been reinforced adequately in the third year
so graduating students are uncertain about the applicability of particular
rules to a problem. Moreover, the significant offerings of statutory courses in
the final two years may leave students handicapped when facing a legal problem in which only common law rules are applicable. In fact, the large number
of third-year subjects who identified the lack of a statute as a problem suggests that we may be teaching students to look for the quick fix of an applicable statute or regulation. Additionally, the proliferation of perspectives and
policy courses in the law school curriculum may not help students develop
coherent rule-based theories for solving legal problems.
Another possible explanation is that, unlike medical school, all law students
have not had a chance during their academic program to be involved in clinical studies. In medical school clinics, third- and fourth-year students have the
opportunity to apply medical knowledge learned in earlier years in the actual
treatment of medical problems and to develop forward reasoning strategies
in the process. While it is unclear how many third-year subjects in this study
had been enrolled in a clinical course, that experience would not have been
equivalent to the extensive one provided in medical school.
This discrepancy between the findings for final-year students in medical
and law school could concern the different natures of medical and legal
problem-solving.44 Perhaps by its very nature, legal analysis requires more
backward-directed reasoning than medical practice. The psychological
literature on expertise, however, suggests that across specialties, forwarddirected reasoning is an attribute of expert problem solving.45
Conclusion
Unlike other disciplines, scholarship on legal education has tended to be
based on the instructor's experiential recollections, philosophical theories, or
psychological theories developed in other areas. The study described in this
article provides an alternative method for assessing the effectiveness of our
pedagogy. Empirical research has a number of benefits: the use of anonymous
samples, the application of standard methodologies and measurements, and,
most importantly, the close analysis of actual reasoning by law students. This
study, however, does reflect the limitations of an empirical approach to legal
education. It is impossible to draw any definitive conclusions from this single
study, especially one with a very small sample from only one law school.

44.

See generally Mark N. Aaronson and Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving
Lawyering: An Exchange of Ideas, ii Clinical L. Rev. 485 (2oo5).

45.

See supra notes 6-io and accompanying text.
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The findings here suggest that second-year law students have begun to rely
on their knowledge base in solving legal problems but still have some of the
same problems in paying attention to detail as entering students. They also
indicate that students have learned to pay more attention to detail between
the second and third years of law school, but they have not yet started to use
forward-directed reasoning and are unable to distinguish adequately between
relevant and irrelevant facts and rules. While robust, these findings are very
preliminary. The data and findings for this study should be thoroughly assessed by other researchers; this study should be replicated at other schools
and with more controlled samples; and perhaps other types of problems (e.g.,
using a statutory issue or providing the applicable legal authority) should be
administered.
Patel and her associates have provided legal scholars with the tools for quite
rigorous analysis of our teaching enterprise. The use of semi-structured interviewing techniques, propositional analysis, and coding protocols provides
researchers with methods for assessing a number of issues in legal education
and practice. Possible research projects include the effect of particular courses in the curriculum (e.g., clinical and skills classes) on the development of
reasoning skills in students; the impact of those courses on practice two or
three years after law school; the nature of problem-solving used by generalists
and specialists in practice; and the comparison between law school curricula
and those in other professions on the development of expert problem-solving.
These and other studies can help us assess the effectiveness of our curricula
and pedagogy and better understand the limits of what we can accomplish in
the three years of law school.

APPENDIX -PROBLEM
Eight months ago, your client, Alexander Samos, a 37 year old electrician
with an eighth-grade education, went to the Midtown Chevrolet dealership
and told the salesman, Edward Warren, that he was looking for a used vehicle.
Mr. Samos, whose second language is English, had not dealt with the dealership on any prior occasion and called his decision to look at its cars "spur of
the moment." After discussing available cars and financing with Warren, Mr.
Samos took a Nissan Altima (different than the one he eventually purchased)
home for the night as a test drive.
The following day, your client returned the car to the dealership and began
discussions about the 2ooi Nissan Altima that he ultimately purchased. Warren told him that the car was "executive driven" and that it was a "great used
car." The sticker stated, "2oo NISSAN ALTIMA, 4 DOOR GLE $14,500.

AS IS-NO WARRANTY."
Upon his decision to purchase the Altima, Warren prepared a number of
documents for your client to sign. These documents, which Mr. Samos shows
you, include a retail installment contract with a purchase price of $13,999; an
odometer disclosure form showing 31,Q48 miles; a handwritten vehicle sales order; a typed vehicle sales order; and a certificate of title. The retail installment
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contract contains the typed word "used" in a box designated "New or Used."
Both vehicle sales orders contain checks in the "Used" box of a section which
also contains boxes titled "New" and "Demo." None of these documents make
reference to the car's prior owner. The front of the certificate of title lists "ENTERPRISE AUTO RENTAL OF INDIANAPOLIS" as the original owner. The back of this title contains a section labeled "First Re-Assignment By
Registered Dealer Only" under which Midtown Chevrolet is listed as dealer
and Alexander Stamos is listed as purchaser. Your client admits signing all
the papers. Although your client does not remember in detail each form he
signed, he did recall that he was neither pressured nor rushed to complete the
paperwork.
Mr. Samos admits having driven the Altima since its purchase without any
serious malfunction. But recently, his friend looked closely at the certificate
of title and found that the previous owner was an automobile rental company.
Your client states that he interpreted Warren's statement "executive driven"
to mean that the car had previously been used by high ranking employees
of either Nissan or Midtown Chevrolet and feels that he was deceived into
purchasing the car because he relied on that statement. Your client admits
he knew he was purchasing a used car, but did not know, nor did he inquire
further, about the Altima's history or previous owner.
Your client wants any damages to which he is entitled. Your state has no
statute that applies to this type of situation. It does have a statute, however,
that allows a court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any case
concerning a consumer transaction.
Based solely on these facts, does your client have any viable legal claim for
damages? What is the basis for your answer?

